However, the series of last year's events brought in further signals which seemed to testify that Polish expectations were unrealistic. The most important and most widely commented event on the domestic policy stage was the recall of Julia Tymoszenko from the position of prime minister, which symbolised the end of the orange coalition then. As W. Fesenko wrote: "After the victory personal arguments and ideological discrepancies among the allies come to the fore: between liberals and supporters of the state interventionism in the field of economy, between enthusiasts and opponents of entering the World Trade Organisation, between the allies and critics of closer relations with Russia. An internal fight for the division of power and ownership began among the leaders of the Orange Revolution. What remained unknown was the time when the rift would occur"12. The second crucial disappointment for politicians and Polish public opinion, but in the international arena, was the capitulation of Kiev in the matter of the Russian gas blackmail. It was experienced as a symbolic departure from the firm policy towards Russians, epitomised by Madam Prime Minister through her earlier, already in an era of Leonid Kuczma, attempts to normalise the country and lead it out of the twilight zone of the power sector. The third, but not least important disappointment was and still is our Polish 'accounts' and internal contradictions. There could be found some parallels between the disintegration of the unity of leaders of Majdan, united in a protest against the former president and his team and in the disintegration of just announced but never existing in Poland coalition of Prawo i Sprawiedliwos and Platforma Obywatelska. In both cases we follow the same way, from common roots to conflicts, probably resulting from personal ambitions and arguments of their political leaders. Without a common enemy in the form of a previous ruling group both these allies broke into competing factions. What is interesting, whereas in Poland the conflict increases and seems to be impossible to solve, in Ukraine there appeared a spark of hope in the form of an agreement between Juszczenko's Nasza Ukraina, Julia Tymoszenko's Blok and Oleksander Moroz's socialists, reached again in April this year. Let us however notice that it does not provide for postulated by BjuTy: accounting for privatisation in Kuczma's time and renegotiations of the agreement with Russia signed on January 2006, concerning the gas supply to the Ukraine. It might be a sign of reaching a renewed compromise of the Orange, with an understanding of a hard, geopolitical situation in Ukraine. It might be equally well a signal that personal ambitions and the desire for power, particularly removing Wiktor Janukowycz from power, were allowed to speak. Especially, if we mention the joke supposedly circulating in Kiev about frustrated Janukowycz who says: "What's up? I have even won in the election and they still do not let me rule!"13. On the other hand in the Polish and foreign press there was a lot of information predicting a completely different arrangement of future coalition. The most likely option beside a repeated alliance of the Orange seemed to be a coalition of Nasza Ukraina and Partia Regionyw.

There appears at last one more thread. This is the attitude of the organisations Ukraine seems to aspire to. In the comments of Ukrainian political commentators and politicians the thread of disappointment with the lack of clear signals from the European Union and NATO is strongly emphasised. The same tendency can be observed on the other side. At the meetings of European Union one could hear voices saying that the orange authorities did not carry out announced market, political and social reforms. Working Plan EU-Ukraine, signed on 21 January 2005, cannot be alone treated as a sufficient argument on a way of Ukraine to join in the EU. The Ukrainians themselves pointed out that it was not implemented to a sufficient extent. According to the estimate of Centrum im Razum- kowa, at the turn of July and in the early August 2005 its implementation "... did not even deserve a strong B mark. During that period the matter of "Political dialogue and reforms" was implemented the best (3.5) and the worst was "Economic