Leonid Kuczma's apparatus, not a calculated personnel policy. A little hope as to the change in this behaviour is found in the statement of Wiktor Juszczenko saying that the appointments of the heads of local administration will depend on the number of votes received during parliamentary elections.16
Summing up one should emphasise that although the foreign policy of Ukraine has changed, there are however no clear signals if it has been a firm and lasting choice. From Polish perspective there are still many ambiguities in it. At the same time a strong tendency to negate or at least sceptically accept the achievements of Majdan has been evident. It can be seen in the moods of the public, where we again observe a decrease in liking for the Ukrainians, in comments made by best-known polling groups dealing with the issues of the East and in the statements of politicians. It seems that two processes appeared in Poland simultaneously. On one hand it is moving Ukrainian issues to the background, especially in the light of dynamic situation in domestic policy of Poland, on the other feeling tired with Ukraine after the period of great interest at the turn of 2004 and in early 2005. We still support the orange team, but last year's enthusiasm does not exist any more. It might, of course, return at any moment, but on certain conditions. For Polish and European politicians this is undoubtedly a problem of an unambiguous standpoint and real actions of Ukrainian authorities on implementation of economic and social reforms. For an average Pole, however, this is a trivial matter of how the border checkpoints function. These border checkpoints should be rather called 'closure or difficulty' checkpoints instead. These words do not at all mean the necessity of having a visa and the tourist being checked carefully, but a total lack of organisation and unwillingness to co-operate.