In February 1946, Stalin gave a speech in which he spoke about “the inevitability of conflict with the capitalist powers”. Kegley, Ch.W. and Wittkopf, E.R., op.cit., p.56

On February 22, 1946, George F.Kennan, at that time charge d’affaires in the US embassy in Moscow, sent to Washington his famous “long telegram” assessing the motivations of the Soviets. Later he published his well-known article “X” in the Foreign Affairs (1947). In it, Kennan argued that Soviet leaders would forever feel insecure about their political ability to maintain power against forces both within Soviet society andin the outside world. Their insecurity would lead to an activist - and perhaps hostile - Soviet foreign policy. Ibid., p.58

In March 1947, the Truman Doctrine was announced. This was a dramatic departure from traditional US foreign, defense, and security policy. It was based on a view of international politics as a contest for world domination, with the SU as an imperial power bent on world conquest. Ibid., p.58

This was the start of containment policy. Containment was designed to circumscribe Soviet expansionism in order to (1) save the international system from a revolutionary state, and (2) force internal changes in the SU. Sullivan, R.S., ‘Dealing with the Soviets’, in Foerster, Sch. and Wright, E.N. (eds.), American Defense Policy (6th. ed. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990), p.165 Containment was a desired condition in US-Soviet relations. It was a geopolitical rather than ideological or military strategy. Its ultimate objective was a stable and peaceful international system. Ibid., p.169

Soon the first results of the containment appeared. The National Security Act (1947) created a unified Department of Defense with an autonomous Air Force, a Joint Chiefs of Staff system, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council. Ibid., p.170 In June 1947, the Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Europe was announced.

In July 1947, intelligence analysts in the War Department maintained that the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan provoked a more aggresive Soviet attitude toward the US. Leffler, M.P., op.cit., p.34 So, the result of the beginning of containment was the escalation.

Another step to deeper hostility was the document called NSC-68 (approved by President Truman on September 30, 1950). NSC-68 was designed to (1) bolster the conventional capabilities, (2) strenghten the strategic nuclear forces, (3) assist the US allies, especially in Europe. Nitze, P.H., ‘Grand Strategy Then and Now: NSC-68 and its Lessons for the Future’, Strategic Review, Winter 1994, p.16

The aim of NSC-68 was “to check and roll back the Kremlin’s drive for world domination.” Trachtenberg, M., ‘American Policy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance’, in Leffler, M.P. and Painter, D.S. (eds.), Origins of the Cold War: An International History (London: Routledge, 1994), p.113

The first military attempt to contain the communism was the Korean War (1950), which had pushed the budget appropriations for defense up to a peak of almost $57 billion (67 per cent of the whole budget) for fiscal year 1952. Williams, Ph., ‘US Defense Policy’, in Baylis, J., Booth, K., Garnett, J., and Williams, Ph., Contemporary Strategy. Volume 2: The Nuclear Powers (2nd. ed. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987), p.34 The Korean War marked a globalisation of containment in terms of operational commitments as well as rhetoric. Brown, S., op.cit., p.58

This period was also marked by the creation of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The NATO Pact was signed in April 1949. This was open-ended, multilateral, peacetime alliance among the US, Canada, and West European nations that commited the US to consider an attack on any member nation as an attack on itself. Korb, L.J., op.cit., p.27 The creation of NATO was a response to Soviet actions in Czekoslovakia, Berlin, and Greece.

Also the US signed bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan and the Philippines and a trilateral pact with Australia and New Zealand (the ANZUS Treaty). All three were signed in 1951.

2. Tough Talk, Accomodative Action, 1953-1962. This was the period of the American superiority in terms of the nuclear capabilities. But President Eisenhover understood that American resources are not endless. The idea of his policy was security and solvency - to regain American initiative in foreign policy without bankrupting the nation. Sullivan, R.S., op.cit., p.172 His policy had two elements. The first was “New Look” defense policy, and second - the formation of a global alliance system.

The “New Look” was based on three concepts: rollback, brinkmanship,and massive retaliation. Kegley, Ch.W. and Wittkopf, E.R., op.cit., p.83

Rollback stated the goal the US was to pursue: reject merely containing the spread of communist influence and instead “roll back” the iron curtain. Ibid., p.83

Brinkmanship was a strategy for dealing with the Soviets by backing them into the corner with the threat of nuclear amihilation. Ibid., p.84

Massive retaliation was a countervalue nuclear weapons strategy that sought to achieve American foreign policy objectives by threatening mass destruction of the Soviet population