political transformations happening in the country, the asymmetric conflict, known as «stability operations,» continued to rage. In 2008, there was no indication of an early victory for the coalition forces. ISAF armies, American forces with «Operation Enduring Freedom», and the ANA were far from defeating the Taliban and Al Qaeda [26]. Instead of destroying the Taliban, fresh manpower flowed in from the Pakistani tribal territories; over which the Afghan government had no authority.
Incidents of violence in Afghanistan in 2008 increased alarmingly. The rebel powers, after spending the winter in the bases on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border [27], quickly rebuilt their militias and in the summer of 2008 began intensive operations [28].
In 2008, 132 American soldiers were killed in action (KIA) and 778 were wounded in action (WIA)[29]. Insurgents set over 2,000 ambushes, a 50% increase from the previous year [30]. For the US military, 2008 was the deadliest year since the beginning of the operation [31]. Through the first half of April 2009, American losses totalled 450 KIA and 2,778 WIA [32].
Diplomats warned in the autumn of 2009 that the situation, in every respect, had not yet been so bad. Everything indicated that in 2009 the coalition's position would face a considerable downturn [33].
Through 28 August 2009, American losses totalled 558 KIA and 3,772 WIA [34]. Since the invasion in 2001, a total of 1,286 coalition soldiers had been killed. In 2009 alone, there were 320 coalition KIA, with the bloodiest month being August, when 75 soldiers were killed.
In 2008, 3,276 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) exploded, a 45% increase compared to the previous year. In the first six months of 2009, there were 828 IED attacks. 108 of those resulted in a coalition fatality.
The British bore especially large losses in the southern province of Helmand, where the death toll from 2002 until August 2009 reached 204 soldiers and the number of wounded hit 741. Since the beginning of 2009, 67 British soldiers were killed [35]. These losses led to protests among the public and 59% of British society demanding the withdrawal of the British contingent, according to «The Guardian» [36].
Behind these losses was the lack of military progress in this conflict which started as the primary stage of the «Global War on Terror.» By the beginning of 2009 this war already possessed a completely different face than in 2001. Especially shocking is that through eight years, neither US nor ISAF forces have not realized most of their military goals. Such conditions have prompted reflection and American analysts if the US and NATO might exit this conflict as winners and whether the conquest of the Taliban and construction of a stable state is possible. Another certainty, of course, is the change in strategy, not only in relation to Afghanistan, but to Pakistan as well [37].
At the beginning of 2008, senior US commanders identified that the American forces were too under resourced for the conquest of the Taliban and stabilization of the country. They suggested immediately sending 10,000 additional troops. In January 2007, the US military amounted to only 20,947, but by the following December had increased to 24,780, reaching 48,250 in June 2008 (37,700 active component and 10,550 National Guard and Reserve). The strengthening of the American contingent was a highly awaited moment [38].
In September 2007, the coalition controlled slightly more than half of the area of the country. The commander of the allied armies, US Gen Dan McNeill, carefully evaluated the number of insurgents to be 20,000, consisting of both Afghanis and holy war Islamic volunteers from other countries [39].
At the end of February 2008, Mike McConnell, the US Director of National Intelligence, testified before a Senate committee that the Taliban controlled 10% of Afghanistan and that President Karzai controlled only 30%, the rest being controlled by Afghan tribes. In October 2008, the National Intelligence Estimate warned that the situation in Afghanistan is «a downward spiral.» In addition to the rebels, another threat to the stability of the country is the widespread corruption in Hamid Karzai's government. Regardless, the coalition armies and Gen. David McKiernan saw that within most of the country there was visible process and accepted the difficulty of fighting the rebellion. Under Gen. McKiernan's guidance this tendency was to continue for some time. According to the report, the serious threat was the opium trade, which supported over 50% of the country's economy [40].
NATO analysis also indicated that where reinforcements had come, in this instance the 24th US Marine Expeditionary Unit in the district of Garmsir, the number of violent acts had diminished about 43% between 2007 and 2008. After a month of intensive fighting, the marines had calmed the area and from ISAF resources, they distributed $823M for
