The antidote for Afghanistan's problems had to be the appointment Gen. David Petraeus [42] to command the US Central Forces Command (CENTCOM), headquartered in Tampa, Florida. Included in this command was responsibility for 20 middle eastern countries on operations «Iraqi Freedom» and «Enduring Freedom.» There was also the development of the US Army Field Manual 3-24 «Counterinsurgency» (COIN), which detailed strategies and tactics that had success in the Iraq war. Theoretically, this success could be duplicated in Afghanistan with minor modifications. The main foundations of the COIN doctrine could be: [43]

the assurance of safety for the Afghan population

cooperation with Afghan security forces

the creation police and other self-defense forces

the transition of American forces from large bases to smaller, more widely dispersed bases

the execution employment programs

the reconstruction of agriculture

dialogue with local leaders

negotiations with the Taliban and attempts to bring less radical groups into the mainstream,

the elimination of radical Taliban elements,

the destruction of detected concentrations of rebels,

the maintaining of already seized locations

the deployment the Afghan National Army to the areas cleared of insurgents

Consequently, the war will change in nature due to both military and political resources. According to the COIN manual:

«COIN involves all political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions that can be taken by a government to defeat an insurgency (JP 1-02). COIN operations include supporting a Host Nation's military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency. Avoiding the creation of new insurgents and forcing existing insurgents to end their participation is vital to defeating an insurgency. COIN operations often include security assistance programs such as foreign military sales programs, the foreign military financing program, and international military training and education programs. Counterguerrilla operations, on the other hand, focus on detecting and defeating the armed insurgent or guerrilla, without solving the society's underlying problems. Military efforts alone, however, cannot defeat an insurgency». [44]

Gen. Petraeus asserted that the strengthening of American forces in Afghanistan served to, first of all protect the population, pursue extremists, support the development of the Afghan defence forces, reduce the drug trade, and enforce the authority of central and local governments. The elections in August 2009 also posed a security challenge. The civil rights of the citizens of Afghanistan and Pakistan were an important consideration. American forces require the support of the Pakistani army in the fight with extremists on the borderland. This is where both armies need to focus their efforts. To facilitate this, American forces will train the Afghan and Pakistani armies, as well as supply equipment and intelligence for the purpose of defeating the extremists [45].

A large problem in Afghanistan is the production and the trafficking of drugs, which generates a $70- 100M profit annually for the Taliban[46]. To combat this would require a significant restructuring of Afghanistan's agriculture, the main occupation for 6070% of the population. Many of these farmers grow poppies, the main ingredient of opium and heroin. [47] Most of these farms are found in the Taliban- controlled southwest, where the profits from drug trafficking finance the rebellion [48].

Simply destroying the poppy fields, as is the current US and ISAF plan, is a poor solution, since it deprives the Afghan farmers of a means to make money. A better solution would be to reintroduce orchards to cultivate the fruit and nuts that Afghanistan was once celebrated for. This would require retraining Afghan farmers, since the agrarian culture has disappeared due to continuous warfare. This would fall within the current plan of improving the agricultural infrastructure, which already includes developing irrigation channels, dams, and wells. Civil consultants and advisors are indispensable in these types of missions. Some small-scale trials have already begun and will increase with future COIN operations [49].

The US government agency, USAID, had success with an agricultural reform program: they educated over 100,000 farmers and supported the planting of more than 3.2M fruit trees. Thanks to this program, Afghanistan exported over 4,200 tonnes of fruit and vegetables in 2008 alone. The following year, 30,000 farmers signed contracts with processors and wholesalers [50].

3,000 soldiers from 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division were assigned to Logar and Wardak provinces in January 2009. In February, President Obama pledged to send 17,000 additional soldiers: 8,000 marines from the 2nd Expeditionary Brigade in Camp Lejune, North Carolina by the end of May, followed by